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Abstract

Self-construal research has shown that the way people view themselves impacts a variety of

cognitive processes.

Research has focused on two levels of self-construal: the interdependent

self-construal, or when the self is represented in relation to others, and the independent self

construal, or when the self is represented independently of others. Findings from the self

construal and cognition research suggest that the interdependent self is associated with diffuse

attention, while findings from the self-construal and creativity research indicate that the

independent self is associated with divergent thinking important for creativity.

The present study

examined the effect of self-construal priming in the novel domain of insight problem solving.

Insight problem solving is an all-at-once means of problem solving that is considered a measure

of creativity, and is associated with diffuse attention.

In the present study, participants received

either an interdependent or independent prime prior to solving a set of compound remote

associate (CRA) problems--a set of creative problems that can be solved either analytically or via

insight.

Overall, participants receiving the independent prime solved more of the CRAs.

However, the expected effect of priming on the number of self-reported insight solutions did not

emerge: there was no effect of self-construal prime on the proportion of solutions achieved via

insight.

This mixed pattern of results provides provisional support for the role of the

independent self-construal in creative thinking, but does not conclusively support, nor refute a

role for self-construal level in insight problem solving.

clarify the relationship between the two.

vii

Rather, further research is needed to

Self-Construal and Insight Problem Solving

Philosophical investigations of the self have a long history in a variety of cultural

traditions, but only recently have experimental methods been used to examine how self

construal, or people's internal representation of themselves, influences thinking (Zhu & Han,

2008).

Research on self-construal has demonstrated that people have distinct levels of self

representation, which are associated with differences in cognition, motivation, and emotion

(Markus & Kitayama, 1 9 9 1 ). In general, this line of research has focused on two specific levels

of self-construal: the interdependent self-construal, or when the self is represented in relation to

others, and the independent self-construal, or when the self is represented independent! y of

others (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).

Using this distinction, research has shown that the

independent self-construal is typically associated with a context-independent, analytic mode of

thinking, while the interdependent self-construal is associated with a holistic, context-dependent

mode of thinking (Kuhnen, Hanover, & Schubert, 2001).

While this association between self

construal level and mode of thinking has been demonstrated in a variety of cognitive domains,

the present research examines how self-construal influences performance on insight problem

solving, an area of research that has not yet been explored.

Self-Construal Research

Differences in self-construal were originally associated with culture, with Easterners'

conceptions of the self focused more on the interconnectedness of individuals and Westerners'

conceptions of the self focused on differentiating oneself from others (Markus & Kitayama,

1 9 9 1 ).

These cultural differences are associated with differences in performance on basic

cognitive tasks.

Perceptually, Westerners have a bias towards perceiving salient foreground
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objects when observing a visual scene, while Easterners have a bias towards context and

background when viewing a visual scene (Nisbett & Masuda, 2006).

This difference is reflected

in Westerners' change blindness to background movements (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006) and

Easters' reduced ability to recognize an object in a novel context (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).

In

categorization tasks, Easterners group together objects that contextually or functionally exist

together (e.g. grouping cow with grass because a cow eats grass) or look similar, while

westerners are more likely to group together objects based on rule based taxonomy regardless of

similarity (e.g. grouping cow with chicken because they are both animals; Norenzayan, Smith,

Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). A consistent pattern of differences is shown in reasoning tasks, such that

Easterners are more likely consider contextual factors when making causal attribution judgments,

while Westerners are more likely to consider salient traits (Choi & Nisbett, 1998).

In terms of

logic, Westerner prefer rule-based, deductive logic and have trouble with discrepancies to these

rules, while easterners prefer dialectical reasoning and are better at handling statements that have

apparent contradictions (e.g. too humble is half proud; Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

In general, the

pattern that emerges is that western thought is linear and analytical, while eastern thought is

more holistic and contextual.

Self-construal priming. Although originally associated with culture, recent research

demonstrates that independent and interdependent self-construals can be primed in people within

a single culture.

For example, Gardner et al. (1999) demonstrated that self-construal can be

primed by asking participants to circle pronouns in a story.

The independent prime version of

the story had only first-personal singular pronouns such as "I" and "me," while the

interdependent prime version of the story had only first-person plural pronouns such as "we" and
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"us." This priming technique shifted participants' representations of themselves towards

individualistic or collectivist values consistent with prime (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999).

Self-construal and cognition. Research examining the effects of self-construal priming on

cognition has yielded results that mirror those observed in cross-cultural studies, indicating that

self-construal may be mediating the observed cultural differences.

Kuhnen and colleagues

(200 I) conducted a set of experiments to see if self-construal priming would induce the same

attentional biases seen in people of Eastern and Western cultures. By measuring performance on

the embedded figures tasks and picture completion tasks, the researchers demonstrated that

interdependent priming increased attention towards context as measured by decreased ability to

pick out embedded figures and increased ability to notice incomplete contextual elements in the

picture completion task.

Conversely, the independent prime resulted in an increased ability to

pick out embedded figures, and reduced ability to notice missing contextual items.

Based on

these findings, the authors propose that the interdependent self-construal is associated with a

context-dependent mode of thinking, whereas the independent self-construal is associated with a

context-independent mode of thinking (Kuhnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001).

Lin & Han (2009) replicated these findings using flanker and compound stimuli tasks.

By measuring response time, the researchers found that the interdependent self-construal prime

slowed response time to targets that were flanked by incongruent stimuli (i.e. responding to a

rightward pointing arrow surrounded by leftward pointing arrows), but increased response time

to global letters (responding to the letter 'H' comprised of mini 'S's) indicating that this

performance was influenced by context.

The independent self-construal prime inoculated against

flanker effects, as measured by response time, and increased response time to local letters (i.e.

responding to the ' S ' s that comprise a global 'H').
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Importantly, these researchers used the

different self-construal primes within subjects, thereby increasing the strength of these findings

by eliminating the possibility of individual differences (Lin & Han, 2009).

Extending these findings to higher order cognitive processes, researchers looked at the

impact of self-construal priming on causal reasoning. After priming self-construal level between

groups, participants were asked to make judgments about the cause of events based on observing

target events that co-occurred with superior and alternative causes.

Context sensitivity was

operationalized as a participant's sensitivity to alternative causes, while context independence

was operationalized as insensitivity to alternative causes when making causal judgments (Kim,

Grimm, & Markman, 2007).

Their findings match that of the perceptual studies, such that

independent priming led to context independent causal judgments, while interdependent priming

led to context sensitivity to alternative causes.

Taken together, studies looking at the effects of self-construal priming on cognitive

processes suggest that the independent self is associated with the processing of salient local

information, while the interdependent self is associated with more holistic processing that

accounts for more contextual information.

One way of interpreting this pattern is that the

priming of an interdependent self-construal creates a more diffuse state of attention, both

perceptually and conceptually, because diffuse attention is needed to be able to integrate context.

Conversely, it could also be said that the independent self-construal priming activates a more

focused attention that ignores contextual elements.

Self-construal and creativity. Not all of the findings from the research fit the picture

presented above however. Based on the findings that independent priming led to contrastive

social comparisons, while interdependent priming led to assimilative social comparisons, Stapel

and Koomen (2001) suggest a role for self-construal in creativity.
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They proposed that

independent priming activates a differentiation mindset important for creative thinking, while

interdependent priming activates an integration mindset as measurable through divergent

thinking tasks. For example, when asking participants to come up with exemplars of a category,

independent priming led participants to come up with more diverse exemplars of a category (e.g.

naming golf-cart as a type of automobile), while interdependent priming led to more common

exemplars (e.g. sedan as a type of automobile; Wiekens & Stapel, 2008).

These findings suggest

that the independent self is associated with the generation of creative ideas.

While these findings

do not directly contradict the previously presented research, they offer an alternative explanation

as to how self-construal impacts thinking.

Problem Solving Research

Problem solving research has generally focused on two different categories of problem

solving: analytic and insight problem solving.

These categories differ in terms of problem type,

and the necessary processes required for a solution. Research on analytic problem solving has

typically examined the steps used by solvers when coming up with solutions to well-define

problems, like math problems.

Insight problem solving research, on the other hand, has

traditionally used non-routine problems to examine how solutions are arrived at in an all-at-once

manner known as "insight." Research has provided behavioral evidence distinguishing these two

general categories of problem solving (Novick & Basock, 2005), and evidence from

neuroimaging studies has demonstrated a distinct and reliable pattern of brain activity associated

with solutions arrived at through insight (versus analytical means) as indicated by self-report of

the solving process (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005).

Problem types. Much of the difficulty faced by problem solving researchers is due to the

fact that there are various different problem types that can be solved using a variety of different
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strategies.

A problem is defined as any situation in which a person seeks to obtain a goal, but

cannot do so simply by action or obvious operations; to obtain the goal, there has to be recourse

to thinking (Duncker, 1945).

According to this definition, everything from math problems to

figuring out what to eat for lunch can be considered a problem, but these two situations represent

two different general categories of problem types.

Typical math problems can be classified as well-defined problems because the operations

necessary to solve the problem, the initial state of the problem, and the solution state are clearly

specified or understood (Kitchener, 1983).

All games, for which the rules are known, such as

chess, are examples of well-defined problems.

Figuring out what to eat for lunch presents a

different type of problem known as an ill-defined problem or a non-routine problem.

Ill-defined

problems are problems for which the necessary solving process or solution state are not clearly

specified or understood (Scraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995).

Most real world problems do not

have a defined solution state or specified solving process, and thus can be thought of as ill

defined problems.

Creative problems fall under this classification, and are defined as problems

that require synthesis of problem information to generate novel or creative solutions not

presented in the initial problem state (Feist, 1 9 9 1 ) .

An example ofa creative problem is

designing a contraption that will preserve an egg if dropped from a particular height using only

certain materials.

Insight problems represent a specific type of creative problems that typically

mislead the solver toward incorrect solving strategies, and thus require the solver to overcome

deceptive information in order to arrive at the solution, often times in a flash of insight

(Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004).

Insight vs. analytic solving processes. Research on problem solving using well-defined

problems has yielded many theories about how problems are solved in a step-by-step manner,
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and has differentiated this analytic approach from non-analytic approaches to problem solving

(Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). Generally, these theorists studied the solving of well-defined

problems to examine the step-by-step process involved, showing how each step brings the solver

incrementally closer to the solution.

For example, the Tower of Hanoi task shown in Figure I

below is a classic problem used in studying analytic problem solving, and the strategy involved

in solving this problem can be labeled the "means-ends analysis."

Initial

The means-ends analysis is an

Goal stcte

state

Figure I . Tower of Hanoi Task.

analytic problem solving approach that involves breaking down the problem into sub-problems

in order to achieve the overall goal.

In the Tower of Hanoi task, a person is presented with three

pegs with three discs stacked on top of each other on peg I .

increasing size.

The pegs are stacked in order of

The goal is to get all three disks on peg 3 in the same configuration moving only

one disc at a time, while never stacking a bigger disk on top of a smaller disk.

With this task, the

first sub-goal may be to move the top discs so that the biggest disc can be moved.

The means

ends approach is just one of the approaches developed by analytic problem solving theorists, and

it illustrates the basic qualities of the general analytic problem solving approach.

For example,

completion of each sub-goal brings the solver closer to the solution, which is typical of the step

by-step focus of analytic problem solving theories.
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Unlike analytic problem solving, insight is the sudden arrival of a solution to the problem

solver and is usually accompanied by a subjective "Aha!" feeling (Mayer, 1995).

Insight is

considered a non-analytic or non-routine approach to problem solving because there is no

apparent analysis involved; the answer simply occurs to the solver unexpectedly.

After the

sudden arrival of the solution via insight, the problem solver is usually unable to trace the exact

steps taken to reach the solution, yet has the intuitive feeling that the solution is correct

(Davidson, 1995).

Metcalfe and Wiebe (198 7) provided some of the earliest empirical evidence for

measurable differences in the solving of analytic and insight problems.

They gave participants

both classic insight problems and non-insight (algebra) problems to solve while they reflected on

the problem solving process.

They found that a participant's subjective feelings of knowing, the

ability to tell if they can accurately solve the problem, predicted performance only on non-insight

problems. Also, they found that feelings of "warmth" of an approaching solution differed

between insight and non-insight problems, such that solvers were not consciously aware of

imminent insight solutions as they are with forthcoming analytic solutions.

Further, Schooler, Ohlsson, and Brooks (1993) demonstrated through a series of

experiments that verbalizing the problem solving processes impaired insight problem solving,

without affecting non-insight problem solving.

By asking participants to verbalize what

processes they were using while solving a problem, the researchers were able to hinder

performance on insight problems compared to participants that were asked to engage in an

alternative, non-verbalization distraction.

This suggests that the cognitive processes that lead to

insight are out of the awareness of the solver.

Fleck (2008) elaborated on this finding by

examining the role of memory on the solving of analytic and insight problems.
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She administered

different measures of short-term and working memory to her participants before giving them

analytic and insight problems to solve.

Analyzing the correlations between the memory

measures and problem solving ability, she was able to predict analytic problem solving ability

from working memory capacity.

This was not the case for insight problems however.

This

suggests that analytic problems increase demands on working memory, thus a higher working

memory capacity facilitates the solving of analytic problems, but not of insight problems. These

studies provide empirical support for differences between analytic and insight problem solving,

and have helped define some of the characteristics of insight problem solving.

Insight Problems. The earliest studies of insight used creative problems that were ill

defined in terms of proper solving process, tacitly emphasizing the role of the problem type on

the subsequent creative solution.

The problems used in this research were labeled "insight

problems" based on the assumption that solver arrived at their solutions via the insight process.

Insight problems usually mislead the solver to incorrect, yet intuitive approaches to solve the

problem (Davidson, 2003).

For example, consider the following problem:

You have blue stockings and red stockings mixed in a dresser drawer in the ratio of 4 to

5.

How many stockings must you remove in order to guarantee that you have a pair that

is the same color? (Davidson, 2003, p. 157)

Because the problem presents the ratio information, it misleads the solver into approaching the

problem by calculating ratios.

To come up with the proper solution, it is up to the solver to

approach the problem in a manner different from what originally seemed correct.

The solver

must ignore the ratio information, and realize that after removing two stockings, even if they are

of different color, the third stocking will guarantee a pair.

This process is called "restructuring,"

which is the re-representation of the problem information in a manner that makes it easier to
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solve (Duncker, 1945).

Related to restructuring, "functional fixedness" is a mental block that

works against the solver's ability to restructure problem information for accurate solution.

Duncker's (1945) candlestick problem is a prime example of this concept.

Duncker gave

participants a box of matches, a box of tacks, and a candle and asked them to attach the candle to

the wall without letting the wax drip below.

The correct solution to this problem requires that

the participant attach one of the container boxes to the wall as a platform upon which the candle

can be placed, rather than fixating on the box's function as a container for matches or tacks.

Both the candlestick problem and the stocking problem exemplify an important

characteristic of classic insight problems: they require the solver to use non-prepotent

information for accurate solution.

The ratios in the stocking problem and the typical

functionality of boxes in the candlestick problem are examples of prepotent information that

hinders the solver's ability to solve the problem correctly.

Because insight problems require that

prepotent information is ignored, solving accuracy on insight problems is used as measure of

creativity (Friedman & Forster, 2005).

Problem Solving via Insight. Later research shifted emphasis from insight problems, to

insight as a solving process. This change in focus was based on the finding that classic insight

problems do not reliably predict that solutions are arrived at via insight (Bowden et al., 2005).

For example, it is possible to solve the stocking problem above using a trial-and-error strategy

rather than using a mathematical approach.

That is, the solver could determine the possible

combinations of colors when pulling out one stocking at a time, and this would lead the solver to

a correct solution through analytic means.

Thus, while traditional insight problems require non

obvious solutions, they do not necessitate that solutions are arrived at via insight.

Moreover,

research has shown that even well-defined algebra problems can require insight-like
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restructuring for a solution to be obtained efficiently (Dow & Mayer, 2004).

3

consider the following problem: ifx

For example,

6

= 12, x

=?

While it is possible to solve this problem by

calculating a cube root, which is relatively difficult, a quicker solution can be obtained by

6

recognizing that x

3
=

x

3.
•

x

Therefore, what was traditionally studied as "insight problem

solving" actually confounded solving accuracy on insight problems with the insight solving

process.

By distinguishing these measures, researchers are able to examine factors that influence

each separately.

In terms of creativity, this discernment suggests that there is a difference

between creative solutions and creative approach, and that one does not necessarily predict the

other.

While earlier insight research used solving accuracy on classic insight problems to infer

that solutions were achieved via insight, later research started examining the insight solving

process through measuring self-reports of the "Aha!" experience.

To this end, Bowden and

Jung-Beeman (2003) developed a set of compound remote associates (CRA) problems which can

be solved via insight or otherwise, and thus have established a paradigm for studying factors that

affect insight.

A CRA problem starts with the presentation of three target words (e.g. mile, age,

and sand), and it is up to the solver to find a single solution word that combines with each target

word to create three compound words (i.e. stone: milestone, stone-age, and sandstone).

CRAs

are advantageous for insight research because they are well-defined yet creative (participants can

use an analytic matching strategy to synthesize information and generate unambiguous solutions

not present in the initial problem state), can be solved relatively quickly, and allow for the use of

many problems during an experimental session, thereby increasing the reliability of the findings.

Importantly, previous research using CRA problems has shown that these problems are solved

via insight about half of the time (Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009;
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Kounios, Frymiare, Bowden, Fleck, Subramaniam, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2006), which

allows for the examination of factors that influence whether solutions are achieved through

insight or otherwise (Kounios & Beeman, 2009).

Using this paradigm, research employing cognitive neuroscience methods has provided

strong support for insight as a distinct and dissociable means of problem solving.

In a set of

related studies, participants solved CRA problems while their brain activity was measured

through EEG and fMRI.

By comparing brain activity of participants when they solved a problem

through (vs. non-insight) as indicated by subjective report of the insight experience, fMRI data

analysis revealed distinct activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus

(ASTG) directly before an insight solution.

Corroborating this finding, ERP data revealed a

burst of gamma-wave activity in the same region right before an insight (vs. non-insight)

solution (Bowden et al., 2005).

These findings indicate that problem solving via insight is

distinct from non-insight problem solving.

Further, because the left ASTG is involved in the

binding of closely related semantic associations, while the right ASTG is involved in the binding

of coarsely related semantic associations (Bowden & Beeman, 1998), these findings support the

notion that insight requires overcoming fixation on prepotent information.

Insight and attention. Research has also demonstrated the role of attention in creative

problem solving.

Ansburg and Hill (2003) examined individual differences in attentional

capacities and its relation to problem solving ability.

They differentiated diffuse attention, or the

ability to attend to a wider array of stimuli, from focused attention, or the ability to filter out

seemingly irrelevant stimuli.

They gave participants a paper with a list of words to memorize

(focal cues) while listening to another list of words on headphones (peripheral cues).

The

participants were later tested with a set of 30 anagrams that were comprised of 10 words
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presented in the focal list (the list presented on paper), 10 words presented peripherally (through

the headphones), and 1 0 that were novel anagrams.

Additionally, the participants were tested

with creative problems (similar to CRAs), deductive reasoning problems, and memory for

focally and peripherally presented words.

They found that creative problem solving accuracy

was correlated with success on anagrams for which cues were presented peripherally.

This result

suggests that overall creative problem solving ability is associated with diffuse attention.

Based on these findings, researchers identified resting-state brain activity related to

patterns of attention that make a person more prone to solving problems using insight (Kounios,

Fleck, Green, Payne, Stevenson, Bowden, & Jung-Beeman, 2008).

In this study, the researchers

used EEG to monitor resting brain activity of participants before having them solve a set of

anagrams and having them report if each was solved through insight.

The researchers divided

participants into low insight (LI) and high insight (HI) groups using a median split based on the

ratio of correctly solved anagrams through insight to correctly solved anagrams without insight.

Analyzing the EEG data, the researchers found that the resting state brain activity of HI group

showed less occipital alpha-band activity, which is indicative of less inhibition of the visual

system, thus leading to more diffuse visual attention.

activity, consistent with heightened focused attention.

Also, the LI group had more occipital beta

This provided further support to the

behavioral data presented by Ansburg & Hill (2003), and highlights the importance of attention

in creative problem solving and insight.

Self-Construal and Problem Solving through Insight

After reviewing the problem solving literature and the various findings yielded from self

construal research, it is possible to synthesize these results to make predictions for the role of

self-construal in insight problem solving.

As outlined above, problem solving research has
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distinguished analytic and insight problem solving on the basis of both problem type and the

processes underlying the generation of a solution.

Though insight problem solving is typically

characterized as the generation of non-obvious solutions to ill-defined problems arrived at

through insight, research has shown that the insight problem solving ability is not necessarily

indicative of the insight solving process.

Research has revealed that differences in creativity

(Ansburg & Hill, 2003) and attention (Kounios et al., 2008) explain differences in performance

and approach in the solving of insight problems.

These findings imply that self-construal

priming may be another way to invoke changes in cognition that can impact insight problem

solving.

views.

Yet, the various findings in the self-construal literature give somewhat contrasting

Consider the findings from the creativity and self-construal research which suggests a

role for the independent self in the generation of creative ideas (i.e. Wiekens & Stapel, 2008).

Because insight problems require non-obvious, creative solutions, these findings lead to the

prediction that independent priming would facilitate the generation of creative solutions as

measured by an increase in solving accuracy on insight problems. Further, because insight is

considered a creative problem solving approach, this research could also be used to make the

prediction that the independent prime would increase the number of solutions arrived at via

insight.

On the other hand, research in the self-construal and cognition literature suggests

different predictions based on the ability of self-construal priming to impact attention.

As

outlined before, research indicates that non-focused, diffuse attention is associated with creative

problem solving (Ansburg & Hill, 2003) and problem solving through insight (Kounios et al.,

2008).

The findings from the perception and causal reasoning studies indicate that

interdependent self-construal priming induces a more diffuse attention state, while the
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independent self is associated with focused attention.

Thus, these studies lead to the prediction

that interdependent priming will increase solving accuracy on insight problems, and facilitate

creative problem solving approach as measured through insight.

Because independent priming

activates a focused attention state, these studies also predict that independent priming would

hinder performance on insight problem solving, and induce a bias towards an analytic problem

solving approach as measured through fewer solutions arrived at via insight.

Table 1 summarizes the predictions made by the two lines of self-construal research. The

self-construal and cognition literature suggests that the interdependent prime would facilitate

insight problem solving ability and increase the number of insight solutions by inducing a diffuse

attention state, while the independent prime would have the opposite effect.

In contrast, the

creativity and self-construal research suggests that the independent self-construal prime will

facilitate insight problem solving performance, and possibly increase the number of insight

solutions by activating a differentiation mindset associated with creativity.

Self-Construal and Cognition

Self-Construal and Creativity

Interdependent
Independent Prime

Independent Prime

Interdependent Prime

!

!

Prime

!

!

Focused Attention

Diffuse Attention

Differentiation
Integration Mindset
Mindset/Creativity

!

!

Lower solving

Increased solving

!

!

Increased solving

accuracy on insight

No predictions for

problems and

the interdependent

possible increase in

prime on insight

proportion of

problem solving

accuracy on insight

problems and lower

problems and higher

proportion of insight

proportion of insight

solutions

accuracy on insight

solutions
insight solutions

Table 1 . Predictions mferred from the separate lines of self-construal research.
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The Present Experiment

To test the predictions made by the different lines of self-construal research, the present

study measured solving accuracy, response time, and the proportion of insight solutions while

participants solved CRA problems before and after self-construal priming.

A post-prime

increase in solving accuracy would indicate a facilitation effect of that particular prime on the

insight problem solving ability.

Similarly, a decrease in response time would indicate a

facilitation effect of that prime on solving ability.

An increase in the proportion of insight

solutions after priming would indicate a change in problem solving approach towards non

analytic means. Thus, it is possible to test predictions from the different lines of self-construal

research.

An increase in solving accuracy following the independent prime would support

findings from the creativity and self-construal research which suggest that the independent prime

activates a differentiation mindset associated with creativity.

However, an increase in solving

accuracy and proportion of insight solutions following the interdependent prime would indicate

that the interdependent prime activates a diffuse attention state associated with creative problem

solving and the insight solving process.
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Methods

Participants

One hundred and thirty-one native English-speaking undergraduates (89 female, 42 male)

at a Catholic university in the Northeast participated in the study for course credit.

Exclusion

criteria based on nationality and culture were used to control for the effects of chronic self

construal.

Only participants that were born and lived continuously in the United States were

allowed to participate.

Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two priming conditions (independent or

interdependent).

Participants completed five practice CRAs, a section of 1 5 CRA problems that

served as the baseline covariate measure, and two sections of 1 5 CRA problems, each of which

were preceded by a self-construal prime of the same type.

problems served as the within subjects factor.

The two post-prime sections ofCRA

During testing, the proportion of accurate

solutions, response time for accurate solutions, and whether or not the solution was solved via

insight were recorded as the dependent measures.

Each dependent measure was analyzed using a

mixed model ANCOV A with the prime condition as the between subjects factor, the two post

prime sections as the within subjects factor, and baseline as the covariate.

Materials

Self-construal prime. To manipulate participants' self-construal, the method developed

by Gardner et al. (1999) was used.

The participants were presented with one of two versions ofa

set of passages on paper (see Appendix A).

Oyserman and colleagues (2009).

The passages were taken from a recent study by

The two versions of the priming passages differed only in
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respect to the pronouns, such that the independent version of the passages contained only first

person singular pronouns (i.e. "I" and "me"), while the interdependent version of the passages

contained only first person collective pronouns (i.e. "we" and "us").

The participants were asked

to circle all of the pronouns found in the passage.

CRA problems. To assess participants' tendency to solve creative problems through

insight, a subset of the CRA problems developed by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) was

presented on a computer screen.

Only the CRA problems that were solved by 50% of

participants or more in the original study were used (see Appendix B).

This left a subset of 60

CRA problems from which 50 were randomly selected for use in a given testing session (5

practice, 15 baseline, and two post-prime sections of 15 CRAs).

Twenty-statements-task

The twenty-statements-task (TST; Kunn & McPartland, 1954) is

a qualitative measure of self-construal that was administered to the participants at the end of the

testing session as a manipulation check of the self-construal prime.

This task required

participants to answer the question "who am I?" with twenty different answers on a sheet of

paper.

This task has been used in previous research to measure how people regard their sense of

self by using a standard coding scheme to measure relative amounts of independent and

interdependent self descriptions (Gardner et al, 1999).

Responses were coded as independent if

they describe a personal attribute (trait, ability, physical descriptor, or attitude---e.g., "I am

smart"), and as interdependent if they describe a role in a relationship (e.g., "I am a daughter") or

membership in a social group (e.g., "I am an American citizen").

Self-construal scale. The self-construal scale (SCS; Singelis, 1994) is a quantitative

measure of self-construal that was administered after the TST as an additional manipulation

check.

The SCS is made of 2 subscales that measure feelings and attitudes comprising

18

independent and interdependent self-construals as separate dimensions. The SCS consists of 30

items that are answered on a 7-point Likert type scale from 1 = disagree strongly to 7 = agree

strongly, half of which measure attitudes associated with the independent self-construal, while

the other half measures attitudes associated with an interdependent self-construal. The SCS and

scoring instructions are provided in Appendix C.

Though the SCS has been shown to posses

adequate internal reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity, intercorrelations between

this quantitative measures and the qualitative measure ofTST has been shown to be low

(Grace

& Cramer, 2003). Thus it may be necessary to use both to adequately measure the priming

manipulation.

Relational-interdependent self-construal scale.

The relational-interdependent self

construal (RISC) scale is another quantitative measure specific to the type of interdependent self

construal more prevalent in Western cultures (Cross, Bacon, and Morris, 2000).

RISC is when

the self is viewed in relation to a person's relationships, and this is different from the collectivist

interdependent self-construal-when the self is viewed in relation to broader group

membership-which is more prevalent in Eastern cultures. The RISC is comprised of 1 1

items

are answered on a 7-point Likert type scale from 1 = disagree strongly to 7 = agree strongly (See

Appendix C).

Because RISC scale was designed as a response to some of the shortcomings of

the SCS in that it is a more culturally specific, it was administered after the SCS in hopes that it

might be a better measure of the priming manipulation.

Biographical questionnaire. After all the tasks were completed, the participants were

asked to fill out a paper questionnaire.

of acculturation of the participant.

The purpose of the questionnaire was to assess the level

The questionnaire asked the participants their country of

origin, their nationality, the ethnicity they identify with, their first language, what languages they
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speak, number of years lived in America, lived abroad, and whether they consider themselves

multi-cultural or not.

Procedure

After filling out the informed consent, participants were instructed on how to make

insight judgments using standard language developed by previous researchers (Kounios et al.,

2008).

Insight was explained to participants as occurring when the solution pops into awareness

suddenly (i.e., an "Aha!" moment), as opposed to resulting from deliberate, conscious effort.

The participants were further told that they might not be sure how they came up with the answer

when insight occurs, but they should be relatively confident that it is correct without having to

mentally check it, as though the answer came into mind all at once. They were told that the

feeling does not have to be overwhelming, but should resemble what was just described.

The

experimenter further discussed insight with the participant until a common understanding was

accomplished.

The experimental session consisted of three sections of CRA problems presented on a

computer screen.

At the beginning of the first section, the participant was instructed on how to

solve the CRA problems followed by 5 practice problems.

For each CRA problem the

participant indicated by button press that they were prepared to begin working on a problem,

thereby initiating the display of a CRA problem. For each problem (e.g., pine, crab, sauce),

participants attempted to produce a solution word (e.g., apple) that could be combined with each

of the three problem words to form a common compound or phrase (pineapple, crabapple,

applesauce).

problem.

The participants were given 30 seconds to come up with a solution for each CRA

When participants achieved a solution, they made an immediate button press

indicating that they had solved the problem.

This was so that response time could be recorded.
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Then the participants were asked to type the solution.

Finally, the participant pressed one of two

buttons to indicate whether or not the solution had been achieved by insight.

After a 2-s inter

trial interval, a "Ready?" prompt appeared; when ready, participants initiated the next trial with

a button press.

The participants were instructed to complete the first section of 15 CRA problems. After

finishing the first section, the participants were instructed to complete the first page of paper

packet, which contained the first self-construal prime.

Once finished, the participant initiated the

second section of 15 CRA problems. After finishing the second section, participants filled out the

second page of the paper packet that contained the second prime (same prime type but with a

different passage).

Self-construal primes were re-administered between CRA sections because

prior research has indicated that these priming manipulations have a small effect size (Oyserman

& Lee, 2008).

As a further manipulation to see how transient self-construal priming is, half of

the participants received a third self-construal prime prior to starting the self-construal

manipulation checks.

This allowed for the comparison of SCS measures of participants primed

directly before the self-construal measures, with those that received the final prime before the

last CRA section.

Once the participants finished all the CRA sections on the computer, they were instructed

to complete the remaining pages of the paper packet, which contained all the post-test

manipulations checks (i.e. TST, SCS, and RISC) along with the biographical questionnaire.

Once all the participants in an experimental session completed all the tasks, they were debriefed

as to the nature of the experiment and dismissed.
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Results

Baseline

To control for individual and group differences at baseline, all the dependent measures

were analyzed using a mixed model ANCOVA with baseline measures as the covariate.

To

ensure that there were no between group differences at baseline, a MANOV A was conducted on

all the dependent measures using priming condition as the fixed factor.

Results from this overall

analysis indicate no significant group differences at baseline, F (3, 1 1 9 ) = 0 . 2 9 1 , p = 0.83, and

effect size measures indicate that only 0.7% of the overall variance in the dependent measures

could be attributed to priming condition,

f\ / =

0.007.

Planned comparison one-way ANOVAs

for each dependent measure confirmed the results obtained in the MANOV A: solving accuracy,

F ( I , 129) = 0.02, p = 0.90; response time, F ( I , 1 2 1 ) = 0 . 0 1 , p = 0.93; proportion insight

solutions, F ( I , 1 2 9 ) = 1 . 5 1 , p = 0.22.

Solving Accuracy

Figure 2 depicts the covariate-adjusted means of the solving accuracy for the

interdependent and independent primed participants as a function of test section. Overall,

independent participants solved a higher proportion of CRA problems than did the

interdependent participants. Additionally, it appears that participants' performance on the CRAs

improved across sessions, regardless of the priming condition.

These impressions were confirmed by the ANCOV A, which revealed a main effect of

prime condition, F ( ! , 129) = 4.25,p = 0.04,

f\ / =

0.032.

On average, participants primed with

an independent self-construal prime solved a higher proportion of CRA problems (M = . 5 1 , SE=

22

. 0 1 ) than participants primed with the interdependent prime

a main effect of post-prime section,

F (1,

129)

=

4.46,

p=

(M =

0.04,

.47,

SE=

!\ / =

.01).

0.034.

There was

also

Participants solved

• Independent

0.6
�

..
�
s

c,

0.5

�
�

..
c

0.4

a
u
._
0

0.3

"

0
�

0.2

e'
"[ii

..

0.1

:;E

0
Baseline

Figure 2.

more problems during the

post-prime section

(M

Post-Prime 2

Solving accuracy of prime group across test section.

second post-prime section

=.49,

post-prime conditions.

Post-Prime I

SE=

.01)

(M=

indicating general

.50,

SE=

. 0 1 ) than during the first

improvement for both groups

However, the interaction of prime condition and post-prime section did

not reach significance F ( 1 ,

129)

=

0.01,p

be solved either analytically or via insight,

=

0.90,

!\ / =

0.00.

Because the CRAproblems may

the difference in accuracy does not,

in and of itself,

indicate that the independent prime facilitates insight problem solving all together.

were the prime to

by insight), this pattern of results would be consistent with the

prediction that independent priming leads to

CRA problem

insight (see

However,

facilitate creative problem solving ability without affecting the problem

solving process (as measured

facilitates

across

below)

will

divergent thinking (Wiekens

&

Stapel,

2008) that

solving. Thus, the analysis of the proportion of solutions achieved

aid the interpretation of these accuracy differences.
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via

To see if priming significantly affected problem solving performance compared to

baseline, planned comparisons of mean baseline accuracy to the mean solving accuracy across

the two post-prime sections were conducted for each prime group separately.

Though neither the

paired sample t-test for the independent group nor the interdependent group reached significance,

t (64) = - 1 . 1 5 , p =0.26 and t (65) = 1.23,p = 0.22 respectively, both group's pre- and post-prime

means showed a trend in the predicted direction. The independent post-prime mean (M = . 5 1 , SD

= .02) was above their baseline mean (M = .49, SD= .02), while the interdependent post-prime

mean (M = .48, SD= .02) was below their baseline mean (M = .50, SD= .02).

The small effect

size of prime condition revealed by the ANCOV A above may explain why these tests did not

reach significance, since self-construal priming can only account for 3 .2% of the overall variance

in the accuracy scores.

It is possible that these differences are due to a difference in effort, such that participants

may have simply attempted more or less problems, thereby altering the likelihood that a correct

solution is achieved.

To see if the accuracy results were due to a change in the number of

problems attempted, indicative of a change in effort by the participant, a final ANCOV A was

conducted on the number of problems attempted regardless of accuracy (i.e. excluding all cases

in which the participant timed out before generating a solution).

The analysis revealed no main

effect for prime condition, F ( I , 129) = 1.22, p = 0.27, no main effect of post prime section, F (1,

129) = 0.98, p = 0.32, and no significant interaction, F (1, 129) = 0.05, p = 0.83.

These results

indicate that the between group difference in solving accuracy was not related to differences in

the number of problems attempted.
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Response Time

Computer failure resulted in the loss of response time data for 6 participants.

Figure 3

depicts the covariate adjusted average median response times to correct solutions of the

remaining 125 participants. In the figure it appears that the response time for the independent

participants decreased from the first to second post-prime section, while the interdependent

participants show an increase. However, the ANCOV A did not reveal a main effect for prime

condition, F ( I , 123) = 0 . 0 1 5 , p = 0.90, nor a significant interaction, F ( I , 123) = 0.80,p = 0.37,

but a significant main effect for post-prime section, F ( 1 , 123) = 1 2 . 9 1 , p < .001,
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Figure 3. Response time for prime group across test section.

Participants average median response times increased from the first post-prime section (M =

7234.82, SD= 208.64) to the second post-prime section (M= 7397.70, SD= 280.15) indicating

an overall increase in solving speed. To tease apart some of these results, and to see if priming

significantly affected response time compared to baseline, planned comparison of average
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median baseline response time to the average median response time across the two post-prime

sections were conducted for each prime group separately.

Neither paired sample t-test reached

significance: t (61) = 0.80,p = 0.43 for the independent group, and t (62) = 1 . 9 1 , p = 0.06 for the

interdependent group. Further, both the independent and interdependent groups showed

decreases in mean response time from baseline (from M= 7640.93, SD= 3606.12 to M=

7275.67, SD= 2424.10, and from M= 8168.93, SD= 3369.99 to M= 7355.81, SD= 2509.57,

respectively).

Insight Solutions

The primary dependent measure assessing insight was the proportion of correctly solved

problems on which the participants reported arriving at the solution via insight. ANCOVA of this

measure revealed that there is no main effect of prime condition, F ( I , 129) = 0.023, p = 0.88, no

main effect of post-prime section, F (!, 129) = 3.34, p = 0.07, and no interaction, F ( I , 129) =

0.007, p

=

0.93.

However, careful examination of the data revealed that this lack of effect may

be due to the fact that participants were not distinguishing between insight and non-insight

solutions; certain participants reported solving all of the CRA problems via insight.

By

excluding participants that reported solving all of the problems via insight on two or more

sections of CRA problems, the data from 41 participants were removed from the analysis.

Figure 4 depicts the covariate adjusted means for the remaining 90 participants.

As shown in

Figure 4, it appears that the independent group showed a decrease in the proportion of solutions

arrived at via insight, while the interdependent group showed an increase.

However, ANCOVA

revealed no main effect of prime condition, F ( I , 88) = 0.35, p = 0.56, no main effect ofpost

prime section, F ( I , 88) = 1.44, p = 0.23, and no interaction, F ( I , 88) = 0.39, p = 0.54.
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These

results suggest that self-construal priming had no measurable impact on problem solving

approach as measured by self-report measures of the insight experience.
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Figure 4. Proportion insight solutions for prime group across test section.

Planned comparisons of mean baseline proportion of insight solutions to mean proportion

of insight solutions across post-prime sections were conducted for each prime group separately

to see if there was a change in proportion from baseline.

Though the independent group showed

a decrease from baseline (M= .76, SD= .19) to post-prime (M= . 7 1 , SD= .20), this difference

did not reach significance, t (40) = l .45,p = 0.15. The interdependent group showed a slight

increase from baseline (M = . 70, SD= .20) to post-prime (M = . 7 1 , SD= .19), but this too did not

reach significance, t (48) = -0.33, p = 0. 74.

Post-Test Measures

To examine the efficacy of the priming manipulation and the transience of this effect,

each of the three post-test self-construal measures were analyzed with separate ANOVAs, using
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priming condition and number of primes (two or three) as fixed factors.

analyses are shown in Table 2.

The means used in these

Because eleven participants did not complete the TST properly

(they either left it blank, or answered using the same response repeatedly), they were excluded

from the analyses, leaving 120 participants.

Further, because the TST score was the proportion

of responses that were either interdependent or independent, the TST score for either self-

construal level is one minus the TST score of the other self-construal level. Thus, only the

interdependent TST score was used for analyses because the scores are redundant. Table 2

illustrates that each of the quantitative manipulation check measures (i.e. the two SCS subscales

and the RISC) followed a consistent pattern, suggesting that having an additional prime prior to

the manipulation checks led to lower scores on each of these measures.

Dependent
Variable

95% Confidence

Prime Condition
Interdependent

3

2
Independent

3

2

TST

Interdependent

Interdependent

scs
Interdependent

Independent

Interdependent

scs
Independent

Primes

Independent

Interdependent

RISC
Independent

Mean
0.52

Std

Error

Interval

.043

0.43

0.60

0.52

.048

0.43

0.61

0.43

.044

0.34

0.52

0.51

.046

0.41

0.60

3

4.72

. 1 09

4.50

4.93

2

4.98

.120

4.74

5.22

3

4.69

.112

4.47

4.91

2

4.94

.116

4.71

5.17

3

4.87

.112

4.64

5.09

2

5.31

.124

5.07

5.56

3

5.15

.115

4.92

5.38

2

5.16

.119

4.92

5.39

3

5.19

.151

4.89

5.49

2

5.35

.167

5.02

5.68

3

5.03

.156

4.72

5.34

2

5.67

.161

5.35

5.99

Table I . Marginal means of self-construal manipulation checks.
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ANOVA of the proportion of interdependent TST answers revealed no main effect of

prime, F ( 1 , 1 1 9 ) = 1 . 3 2 , p = 0.25, no main effect of prime number, F ( 1 , 1 1 9 ) = 0.80,p = 0.37,

and no interaction F (1, 1 1 9 )

=

0.69,p

=

0.41.

However, the ANOVAs for each of the

quantitative self-construal measures provided confirmed the pattern noticed in Table 2: receiving

an additional prime prior to the quantitative measures resulted in lower scores on each of these

measures.

ANOVA of the SCS interdependent subsection revealed no main effect of prime, F

(1, 129) = 0.02,p= 0.89, a near significant main effect of the number of primes, F (1, 129) =

3.68,p = 0.06, and no interaction, F ( 1 , 129) = 0 . 1 3 , p = 0.72.

Similarly, ANOVA of the SCS

independent subsection revealed no main effect of prime, F (1, 129) = 1.08,p = 0.30, a near

significant main effect of the number of primes, F ( 1 , 129) = 3.84,p = 0.052, and no interaction,

F (1, 129) = 2.04,p = 0 . 1 6 .

Lastly, ANOVA of the RISC scale revealed no main effect of prime,

F ( 1 , 129) = 0.08,p = 0.78, a near significant main effect of the number of primes, F (1, 129) =

3.57,p = .06, and no interaction, F ( 1 , 129) = 1.96,p = . 1 6 .

The results from the ANOVAs on

the quantitative measures indicate that an additional prime, regardless of type, decreased scores

on each of these measures.

While this pattern of results does not show congruence between

prime type and score on the self-construal measure, previous studies have shown an effect of

self-construal prime on a cognitive task without showing effects on the self-construal measures

(Oyserman & Lee, 2008).

The TST measure, however, shows a pattern of means that is more congruent with prime

condition, especially when participants received a third prime. Thus, a final comparison of mean

TST interdependent scores was conducted between prime groups, but including only participants

that received a third prime prior to the post-test measures.

Though the difference did not reach

significance, t (62) = 1.804,p = . 1 8 , the mean scores were consistent with prime condition, such
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that the interdependent group had a higher mean score than the independent group (M = .52, SD

=

.05 and M = .43, SD= .05 respectively).

Discussion

The goal of the current study was to assess the effects of self-construal priming on insight

problem solving. Overall, participants receiving the independent prime solved more of the

CRAs.

However, the expected effect of prime on self-reported use of insight did not emerge:

there was no effect of self-construal prime on the proportion of solutions achieved via insight.

There are several interpretations consistent with this mixed pattern ofresults: 1) The self-report

measure of insight was not reliable enough to capture the effect of self-construal prime on

problem solving process. 2)

The effect of the independent prime on solving accuracy reflects an

increase in the ability to solve insight problems without altering the solving process used by the

participant.

3) The positive effect of the independent prime on solving accuracy may reflect a

motivational effect of the prime on insight problem solving ability.

Analysis of the proportion of insight solutions provides support for the first

interpretation. The proportions of insight solutions obtained in the current study were well above

the proportions obtained in previous research using CRA problems, which have indicated that

participants achieved solutions via insight about half of the time (Subramaniam et al., 2009;

Kounios, et al., 2006).

Thus, it is possible that participants were not distinguishing between

insight and non-insight solutions, leading to the disproportionally high rates of insight solutions.

Support for the other two interpretations comes from findings yielded in the self-construal

literature.
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Self-Construa/ and Creativity

Wiekens and Stapel (2008) demonstrated that self-construal priming influences

performance in a divergent thinking task, such that independent (vs. interdependent) priming led

to more diverse answers when participants were asked to generate examples of a category.

Their

study was based on findings showing that independent priming is associated contrastive self to

other comparisons, or a differentiation mindset, while interdependent priming is associated with

assimilating the self with others, or an integration mindset (Stapel and Koomen, 2001).

The

authors claim that thinking of the self as individualized and different leads to thinking

"different," and that this is an important process for the generation of creative thought (Wiekens

& Stapel, 2008). Wiekens and Stapel (2008) further propose that this effect may explain why

individuals working alone are better at coming up with more unique ideas than people working

in groups, giving applicability to the theorized connections between self-construal and creative

thinking.

The solving accuracy from the present study support this theory in as much as solutions

to CRAs are a measure of divergent thought, and suggests that insight problem solving is another

domain of creative thought that is influenced by self-construal manipulations in a manner similar

to how it affects the generation of divergent ideas. However, results from the analysis of the

proportion of insight solutions indicate no effect of self-construal prime. This suggests that CRA

solving accuracy is a more reliable measure of creativity than self reports of insight solutions, or

that the independent self-construal may be associated with overall insight problem solving

performance without influencing the underlying process involved.
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Assuming that performance on CRA is a more reliable measure of creative problem

solving than self reports of insight solution, the findings from the present study provide some

support to the idea that the independent self is associated with creativity.

The role of the

independent self in creativity comes from findings revealed by studies that have examined self

construal in relation to creative and conforming behaviors.

For instance, Ng (2003) used

structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the relationship between culture, self-construal,

and creativity and conformity measures. The researcher showed that collectivist cultures, through

activation of an interdependent self-construal, increases motivations for conformity to others,

while individualistic cultures activate an independent self-construal which increases motivations

to be creative and different in relation to others. Further, these assocations predicted scores on

the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974), giving the model good statistical fit

(Ng, 2003).

The results from the SEM reflect the findings from the divergent thinking research,

suggest that creativity and conformity are inversely related to each other, and indicate that self

construal level impacts creativity and conformity measures in opposite ways.

While the results from the present study provide some support to the findings yielded

from the self-construal and creativity research, the degree to which this line of research informs

the underlying mechanisms involved is yet undertermined. The differentiation mindset provides

a good theoretical explanation as to why the independent self engages in thinking that is related

to creative solutions, but it provides relatively inadequate explanation for the underlying

cognitive processes involved.

The lack of a mechanistic explanation provided by this line of

research leaves open the possibility that there may be motivational factors at play.
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Self-Construal and Motivation

One of the most well established lines of self-construal research examines the impact of

self-construal priming on social motivations and values.

Because of the inherently social nature

of self-construal (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), this line of work has had great success in revealing

specific ways that self-construal level interacts with other intrapersonal factors to explain

complex social dynamics (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009), and also provides additional explanations

for the results of the present experiment. A recent investigation of the effect of self-construal

priming on self-presentational goal activation demonstrated that independent priming led to

increased self-deception enhancement (a form of socially desirable responding that presents an

inflated view of one's capability and intelligence), while interdependent priming increased

impression management (a form of socially desirable responding that presents oneself as

normatively appropriate; Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009).

Interestingly, the researchers demonstrated

that the self-deception enhancement associated with independent priming improved performance

on a test of general knowledge (Trivial Pursuit questions), but not if the participants had the

opportunity to self-affirm their self worth, which reduced the motivation for self-presentational

goal pursuit (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009).

Though the researchers did not systematically control

for intelligence, these findings suggest that the motivations activated by self-construal priming

are strong enough to affect performance on knowledge based tests, which highlights another

potential factor that may be at play in the current experiment.

Thus, it could be that the

motivation to appear competent and intelligent associated with independent priming was

underlying the increased solving accuracy over the interdependent group.

Though this

interpretation is not supported by analyses of the number of CRA problems attempted (assuming

that an increased motivation would lead participants to attempt more problems), it still points to

33

the possibility that more macro-level social emotive processes can mediate the effects of self

construal priming on tests of cognitive performance.

Thus, looking at interactive roles of other

complex social motivations as mediators of self-construal priming on insight problem solving is

a promising direction for future work.

Self-Construal and Cognition

Regardless of whether the pattern of current results is attributable to effects of the

independent prime on motivation or on "undetectable" processes involved in insight problem

solving, the results from the present study are inconsistent with the larger body of work that has

examined the role of self-construal in various cognitive domains. This body of work has

suggested that the independent self is associated with a focused, context-independent mode of

thinking, while the interdependent self is associated with more diffuse, context-dependent

thinking (Kuhnen, et al., 2001).

Because insight research has demonstrated that diffuse (vs.

focused) attention is related to insight (Kounios et al., 2008), the self-construal and cognition

studies predict that the interdependent, rather than the independent prime would facilitate insight

problem solving.

Despite this discrepancy, there are a few interpretations regarding the role of

attention that can explain why the results of the present study do not match the findings from

previous work.

Self-construal and attention. Based on results showing how the interdependent self

construal is more sensitive to context, it was assumed that being able to process various

contextual elements implies diffuse attention.

However, closer examination of the methods

employed in these studies indicates that the scope of attention required for these experiments is

largely constrained by the experimental stimuli used.

In the perceptual studies, participants were

responding to relatively small visual stimuli, making unnecessary the need for a wider attentional
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capacity to perceive all the local elements at once.

For example, the studies of Kuhnen and

colleagues (2001) used test stimuli that were presented to the participants on paper, presumably

small enough to preclude the need for a diffuse attention state.

Even in the causal reasoning

studies, the attentional capacity was constrained to giving judgments about only two causes,

making it easy to attend to both (Kim et al., 2007).

Thus, one possible reason why the results of the present study do not support findings

from the self-construal and cognition may be due to the fact that self-construal does not affect

attentional capacity per se, but how attended information is processed: synthetically or

analytically.

This interpretation reconciles the notion of context dependence/independence as

suggested by the cognition researchers, with the notion of integration/differentiation mindsets as

proposed by Stapel and Koomen (2001).

Put differently, it is that the interdependent self is

associated with the binding or synthesizing of whatever information is presented, whether it is

visual or conceptual, rather than a wider attentional net. Conversely, the independent self is

associated with the differentiation of available information, visual or otherwise, rather than a

sharpened attentional focus.

Moreover, while many of the findings from the previous research

can be explained by either theoretical explanation, adding the construct of attention does not add

to the explanatory power of how self-construal impacts cognition.

This interpretation can explain the results obtained in the current study. During the

presentation of each CRA problem, three target words are presented to the participant at once.

If

the above interpretation is correct, then the interdependent primed participants may be more

prone to relating the target words to each other, rather than discriminating a novel solution word

that relates to each target word in a distinct and unrelated manner.

While this error was not

analyzed systematically in relation to priming condition, post-test verbal reports of participants
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and inspection of incorrect solutions indicates that some participants were relating the target

words rather than finding a unique solution.

Correlational support for this interpretation also comes from a variety of studies that

show how the interdependent self-construal is associated with the inability to decompose the

contextual elements into their constituent parts (see Nisbett & Masuda, 2006, for a review).

Additionally, one of the core assumptions of self-construal theory is that the interdependent self

construal is associated thinking in terms of interconnectedness, while the independent self

construal is associated with thinking in terms of disconnect from others.

This new interpretation

thus provides explanation for the results yielded from the present study, without detracting from

interpretations of previous results found in the self-construal and cognition literature.

CRA problems. Further investigation of the source of difficulty in CRA problems offers

another explanation as to why the results of the present study seemingly go against the self

construal and cognition literature, and opens the possibility for an advantage of the

interdependent prime on a task that requires synthesizing problem information. Such is the case

with the original remote associates test (RAT) developed by Mednick (1962).

RAT problems

consist of three target words that are associated with a single solution word, but unlike the CRAs,

the association between the target and solution is not limited to linguistic morphology.

Associations between targets and solution in the RAT can also be based on synonymy,

semantics, or by some other relation, consequently making them ill-defined in terms of a

sufficient solving strategy that could be used for every problem. CRA problems were developed

based on the RAT, but as an attempt to constrain the types of associations allowable between

targets and solution in order to disambiguate a unique, one word solution, and to make for a

problem set that is well-defined in terms of an analytic solving strategy (Bowden & Jung-
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Beeman, 2003).

In doing so, however, they developed a task that possibly requires context

independence in the processing of association types.

Semantic associations between words are generally based on some meaningful

connection relating the two concepts (e.g. banana is associated with yellow because bananas are

yellow), however the rules of English morphology work more as a discrete combinatorial unit

system in that the combination of two words into a compound word can create a word with a

completely new meaning (e.g. a hushpuppy is neither a 'hush' nor a puppy).

Though it is not

always the case that the two words comprising a compound word are unrelated, the rules

allowing for their combinations are different from rules of semantic association. For CRA

problems, this means that the solver must use one type of association, rather than allowing the

target words to trigger any and all types of associations, most of which would work against the

solution.

This interpretation is in line with the cognition literature that associates focused

processing with independent priming, and is supported by research that has shown that

independent self-construal is associated with the ability to filter out processes irrelevant to the

task at hand (Hannover, Pohlmann, Springer, & Roeder, 2005).

This interpretation explains the

solving accuracy findings with a processes oriented explanation, and makes a prediction for the

interdependent prime as a facilitator of the processes required by the RAT. Because solving RAT

problems does not require processing of any specific type of relationship, the interdependent

prime might perform better on these tasks than the independent prime.

Task Demands

Another possible reason for the apparent discrepancies between the findings yielded from

the cognition and creativity lines of research is the type of dependent measures examined by

each group of researchers, and the processes they were used to infer.
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The cognitive studies of

self-construal generally used analysis of tightly controlled quantitative behavioral measures (e.g.

RT and solving accuracy) to infer how information was being processed as input.

Using the

perception studies as an example, quicker response time to a local (vs. global) letter was used as

support for showing that the participant had a bias toward perceiving the local element of the

compound letter (Lin & Han, 2009).

However, studies of creativity used analysis of qualitative

measures from behavioral output as indices of the creative processes involved in the generation

of creative ideas (Wiekens & Stapel, 2008).

Thus, comparing the results from these two lines of

research is confounded by the stage of information processing that is being examined, and does

not preclude the idea that self-construal priming has qualitatively different effects on input and

output processes. The differential effects self-construal priming on perception and behavior is

exemplified by the fact that independent self-construal priming leads to self-evaluations that

emphasize differences and distances from social others (Gardner et al., 1999), while the same

priming leads to a projection of presentational effects towards social others in behavioral studies

(Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). In terms of the present study, the CRA problems provided a more

controlled and easily quantifiable measure than what was used in previous self-construal and

creativity studies, yet the task is still output oriented since participants were required to generate

solutions to problems.

This makes it difficult to compare our results to some of the more

traditional studies of self-construal and cognition.

This explanation also sheds light onto the relative difficulty of the task used in the present

study compared to previous self-construal and cognition studies.

While it could be argued that

Kim's et al. (2007) self-construal and causal reasoning study is an example of a higher order

cognitive process that was influenced by self-construal priming, the task in their study required

the participants to make simple judgments based on passive viewing of causal scenarios.
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Compared to solving CRA problems, causal reasoning judgments potentially require much less

mental effort, and are unconstrained by the necessity of a correct response.

The relative difficulty of CRA problems may explain the small effect sizes obtained in

the present experiment.

Though there were no floor effects to indicate that the CRAs were too

difficult to obtain group differences, it still is possible that the difficulty of the task overpowered

any effect of priming. Further, a recent meta-analysis of self-construal priming studies showed

that the pronoun circling priming technique used in the present study has moderate to low effect

sizes, on average, in studies of cognition (d '.S 0.5; Oyserrnan & Lee, 2008).

However, inspection

of the cognition studies used for this component of the meta-analysis revealed that most of the

studies were either studies of the effects of priming on perception that have been reviewed here,

or studies looking at the impact of priming on social cognition tasks (see Appendix A in

Oyserrnan & Lee, 2008).

Though social cognitive processes may be more complex than basic

perceptual processes, a salient self-construal has more task relevance to, and a stronger, more

nuanced effect on social cognition tasks (Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006).

Therefore, the small

effect sizes obtained in the present experiment may be attributable to the difficulty of the task,

and points to the possibility of other socio-emotive processes confounding the effects of self

construal priming.

Future directions

While findings from the present study did not fit any particular self-construal theory

completely, the discrepancies between the findings highlighted problems in the literature that

need further clarification.

For example, current analyses suggest that attention is not an

intervening variable that moderates the effects of self-construal priming on cognition. While this

seems to go against a large body of established research, careful examination of the constructs
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equivocated with attention shows that attentional capacity explanations of self-construal may

have been confounding the type of processing with the breadth of processing. Further,

examination of the test items indicates that the CRA problems require a different sort of

association process that fit in with a context independent explanation of cognition. However, due

the relative difficulty of this task compared to other studies of self-construal and cognition, the

effect sizes obtained in the current study are fairly small.

Possible confounds that may have

mediated the observed effects include motivational issues that are powerful enough to improve

performance in ways that would otherwise only come from intelligence.

In discussing the how the current research modifies, is explained by, and extends current

work in the self-construal literature, the present study also provides a number of directions for

future work.

One line of work that is lacking in empirical evidence is the degree to which the

differentiation-integration paradigm as an explanation of creative performance carries over to

other tasks.

Further, it is necessary to show the limits and constraints of such a theory, in order

to show more specifically how self-construal priming affects cognition.

For instance, if the

creative task tested involves synthesizing information, would we expect more creativity out of

the interdependent prime group?

Lastly, there is a necessity for a more operationalized

definition of focused and diffuse attention as it pertains to self-construal priming because so

much of the research has been based on this assumption.

While the current study suggested no

role for attention in self-construal priming, it does not rule out the possibility that self-construal

cannot modulate attention at a more basic perceptual level.
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Conclusion

In summary, the present study demonstrated the influence of self-construal priming on

the higher order cognitive domain of insight problem solving. Results provide provisional

support for the idea that the independent self is associated with a differentiation mindset that

facilitates CRA problem solving ability, while the interdependent self is associated with an

integration mindset that work against CRA solving ability.

However, analyses of insight

solutions do not necessarily confirm this interpretation. Critical analysis of prior self-construal

and cognition studies suggests that the attention modulating properties of self-construal priming

were not underlying the observed effects, but offer other explanations such as the congruence of

processing mindset with processes required by CRA problems.

Future work will further examine

the congruence/incongruence of self-construal priming effects on prime appropriate tasks to fully

outline the role of self-construal on cognition, and to unify the various descriptive explanations

that have been proposed as to the nature of self-construal priming effects.
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Appendix A
Self-Construal Priming

From: Oyserman, D. Sorensen, N. Reber, R., & Chen, S. (2009) Connecting and separating

mindsets: Culture as situated cognition. Journal o
fPersonality and Social Psychology 2, 217-

235.

Instructions

Below are two versions of the general task instructions, once for the paper version, and once for

the computerized version. Instructions are followed by each of the specific priming paragraphs

used in Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen. Note that the original prime is the visit to the city

version, which is from Gardner and Gabriel, 1999. This paragraph is presented first.

Please read the paragraph on the next page carefully and circle all the PRONOUNS found within

the paragraph. The pronouns may be singular (e.g. he, she, etc.) or plural (e.g. they, their, etc).

Please take your time.

Please read the paragraph on the next page carefully and click on all the PRONOUNS found

within the paragraph. The pronouns may be singular (e.g. he, she, etc.) or plural

(e.g. they, their, etc). Please take your time.

Passages

Passage 1

Interdependent. We go to the city often. Our anticipation fills us as we see the

skyscrapers come into view. We allow ourselves to explore every comer, never letting an

attraction escape us. Our voices fill the air and street. We see all the sights, we window shop, and

everywhere we go we see our reflections looking back at us in the glass of a hundred windows.

At nightfall we linger, our time in the city almost over. When finally we must leave, we do so

knowing that we will soon return. The city belongs to us.
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Independent. I go to the city often. My anticipation fills me as I see the skyscrapers come

into view. I allow myself to explore every corner, never letting an attraction escape me. My

voice fills the air and street. I see all the sights, I window shop, and everywhere I go I see my

reflection looking back at me in the glass of a hundred windows. At nightfall I linger, my time in

the city almost over. When finally I must leave, I do so knowing that I will soon return. The city

belongs to me.

Passage 2

Independent. I love to watch the sunset across the lake. Each night during the summer, I

drive my car over to the beach near my house where I relax my body and watch the colors paint

the canvas in the sky. I like to bury my hands in the cool sand and stare into the golden ball of

fire as it sinks into the water. The heat that warmed my face slowly fades away and leaves my

body with a cool chill. The bright colors in the sky above me hurt my eyes but the scene is too

beautiful to look away. Slowly, the light fades completely and I am immersed into the growing

darkness. As I get up, I brush the sand off my body and think to myself, how fortunate I am to

experience such a beautiful site everyday. The night rests upon me and I return home to fall

asleep to wait for a new day.

Interdependent. We love to watch the sunset across the lake. Each night during the

summer, we drive our car over to the beach near our house where we relax our bodies and watch

the colors paint the canvas in the sky. We like to bury our hands in the cool sand and stare into

the golden ball of fire as it sinks into the water. The heat that warmed our faces slowly fades

away and leaves our bodies with a cool chill. The bright colors in the sky above us hurt our eyes

but the scene is too beautiful to look away. Slowly, the light fades completely and we are

immersed into the growing darkness. As we get up, we brush the sand off my bodies and think to
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ourselves, how fortunate we are to experience such a beautiful site everyday. The night rests

upon us and we return home to fall asleep to wait for a new day.

Passage 3

Independent.

On summer weekends I like to go to the beach. I bring a blanket and my

radio and lots of sunscreen. I always remember to bring my sunscreen. Before I swim I rub it on

so my skin won't get burned. When I get to the beach, I set my stuff up quickly. Then I run into

the water. I love to swim out to the diving dock and jump off the highest board. I have a small

boat and love boating on the lake. After the swim, I love lying on my blanket, and reading a good

book or I have some ice-cream. I always have fun at the beach, and I always look forward to

another day.

Interdependent. On summer weekends we like to go to the beach. We bring a blanket and

our radio and lots of sunscreen. We always remember to bring our sunscreen. Before we swim

we rub it on so our skin won't get burned. When we get to the beach, we set our stuff up quickly.

Then we run into the water. We love to swim out to the diving dock and jump off the highest

board. We have a small boat and love boating on the lake.

After the swim, we love lying on our blanket, and reading a good book or we have some ice

cream. We always have fun at the beach, but we are always tired by the end of the day.

Passage 4

Independent. I get up early in the morning and wash my face with ice cold

water. Then I quickly go to the cows, which I have to milk. I gather eggs from my hens, and

cook myself a delicious breakfast. There is always a lot work for me to do. I have to clean the

pigsty and the cowshed. In the afternoon, I love to take my horse for a ride through the fields.

The wind runs through my hair and sometimes I see deer. In the evening I feed all animals again,

50

before I go inside and make my dinner. My hands and feet hurt a little from the tiring work.

When I leave, I am happy but ready for sleep.

Interdependent. We get up early in the morning and wash our faces with ice cold water.

Then we quickly go to the cows, which we have to milk. We gather eggs from our hens, and

cook ourselves a delicious breakfast. There is always a lot work for us to do. We have to clean

the pigsty and the cowshed. In the afternoon, we love to take our horses for a ride through the

fields. The wind runs through our hair and sometimes we see deer. In the evening we feed all

animals again, before we go inside and make our dinner. Our hands and feet hurt a little from the

tiring work. When we leave, we are happy, but ready for bed.
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AppendixB
Normative Data on CRA Problems

From: Bowden, E.M., & Jung-Beeman, M. (2003). Normative data for 144 compound remote

associate problems. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 35, 634-639.

Remote Associate
Solutions

% of participants

mean

solving item in 30

solution time

sec

(ms)

standard

Items

deviation

cottage/swiss/cake

cheese

64%

10847

7037

cream/skate/water

ice

90%

4117

3579

loser/throat/spot

sore

82%

6315

4062

show/life/row

boat

79%

10300

7224

night/wrist/stop

watch

97%

6266

5826

duck/fold/dollar

bill

92%

6582

4280

rocking/wheel/high

chair

87%

5840

5364

dew/comb/bee

honey

100%

4115

2142

fountain/baking/pop

soda

92%

5496

3296

preserve/ranger/tropical

forest

85%

9733

6075

aid/rubber/wagon

band

69%

6510

4620

flake/mobile/cone

snow

79%

8684

7020

cracker/fly/fighter

fire

85%

6115

3868

safety/cushion/point

pin

74%

5001

2839

cane/daddy/plum

sugar

97%

5449

4917

dream/break/light

day

56%

7906

6722

fish/mine/rush

gold

74%

9072

6830

political/surprise/line

party

90%

8787

5200

measure/worm/video

tape

87%

8364

5236

high/ district/house

school

74%

8896

7748

sense/courtesy/place

common

67%

9245

8108

worm/shel£1end

book

85%

6759

6252

flower/friend/scout

girl

67%

11427

7702

river/note/account

bank

79%

10532

5878

print/berry/bird

blue

77%

13236

7940

date/alley/fold

blind

85%

7059

5420

opera/hand/ dish

soap

62%

7920

6450

cadet/capsule/ship

space

74%

5459

3956

fur/rack/tail

coat

79%

7996

6760

stick/maker/point

match

21%

12195

8152

hound/pressure/shot

blood

72%

6975

5319

fox/man/peep

hole

64%

7059

4796

sleeping/bean/trash

bag

82%

6801

6360

food/forward/break

fast

82%

7731

5770

shine/beam/struck

moon

62%

6167

4932
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peach/arm/tar

pit

67%

10014

7967

water/mine/shaker

salt

85%

7852

3371

palm/shoe/house

tree

51%

13895

7899

basket/eight/snow

ball

72%

10866

7176
5468

nuclear/feud/album

family

85%

9476

sandwich/house/golf

club

82%

9098

4955

sage/paint/hair

brush

69%

9879

6869

french/car/shoe

horn

69%

12583

8708

boot/summer/ground

camp

54%

4458

2322

mill/tooth/dust

saw

51%

7135

5453

main/sweeper/light

street

64%

7696

5648

pike/coat/signal

turn

64%

12552

9680

wagon/break/radio

station

51%

14568

8773

dress/dial/flower

sun

51%

7778

5720

eight/skate/stick

figure

59%

5550

4175

down/question/check

mark

54%

11351

7099

carpet/alert/ink

red

59%

11022

8142

master/toss/finger

ring

51%

14676

7167

hammer/gear/hunter

head

56%

8132

5185

knife/light/pal

pen

62%

9187

7141

way/board/sleep

walk

64%

11450

8435

blank/list/mate

check

51%

6115

2572

mouse/bear/sand

trap

72%

7626

6270

cat/number/phone

call

54%

11736

7004

keg/puffi'room

powder

62%

6436

4326

type/ghost/screen

writer

54%

9372

7084

wet/law/business

suit

59%

11240

8457
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Appendix C
Self-Construal Scale (SCS) and Scoring Instructions
From: Singelis,

T. M. (1994).

The measurement of independent and interdependent self

construals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 580-591.

INSTRUCTIONS

This is a questionnaire that measures a variety of feelings and behaviors in various situations.
Listed below are a number of statements. Read each one as if it referred to you. Beside each
statement write the number that best matches your agreement or disagreement. Please respond to
every statement. Thank you.
I =STRONGLY DISAGREE

4=DON'T AGREE OR

5=AGREE SOMEWHAT

2=DISAGREE

DISAGREE

6=AGREE

3=SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
__ 1 .

7=STRONGL Y AGREE

I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.

__2. I can talk openly with a person who I meet for the first time, even when this person is
much older than I am.
3.
__4.
5.

Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument.
I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact.
I do my own thing, regardless of what others think.

__6.

I respect people who are modest about themselves.

__7.

I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person.

__8.

I will sacrifice my self interest for the benefit of the group I am in.

__ 9.

I'd rather say "No" directly, than risk being misunderstood.

__ 10. Having a lively imagination is important to me.
__ 1 1 . I should take into consideration my parents' advice when making education/career plans.
__ 12. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me.
__ 1 3 . I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met.
__ 14. I feel good when I cooperate with others.
__ 1 5 . I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards.
__ 16. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible.
__ 17. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my
own accomplishments.
__ 18. Speaking up during a class (or a meeting) is not a problem for me.
__ 19. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor (or my boss).
__20. I act the same way no matter who I am with.
__2 1 . My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me.
__22. I value being in good health above everything.
__23. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group.
__24. I try to do what is best for me, regardless of how that might affect others.
__25. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.
__26. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group.
__27. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.
__28. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.
__29. I act the same way at home that I do at school (or work).
__ 30. I usually go along with what others want to do, even when I would rather do something
different.
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SCORING

The attached scale contains the original 12 independent items (#s 1 , 2, 9, 10, 13, 1 5 , 18, 20, 22,
25, 27, and 29) and 12 interdependent items (#s 3, 4, 6, 8, 1 1 , 16, 17, 19, 2 1 , 23, 26, and 28)
from Singelis, 1994. Six additional items have been added to improve internal reliabilities of the
original scale: independent (#s 5, 7, and 24) and interdependent (#s 12, 14, and 30).

Cronbach

Alpha reliabilities with the 1 5 items have been ranging from the high .60's to the middle .70's. It
is felt that these reliabilities are adequate considering the broadness of the construct and the wide
range of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors assessed by the scale. Items more focused on a single
aspect of self would yield higher internal consistency but would threaten the validity of the
measure.
To score the scale, add each subject's scores (1 to 7) for the independent items and divide by 15
to give the mean score of the items.

Then, do the same for the interdependent items. Each

subject receives two scores: one for the strength of the independent self and one for the

interdependent self. My research has shown that these two aspects of self are separate factors,
not opposite poles of a single construct. Therefore, each aspect of self needs consideration.
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AppendixD
Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) Scale and Normative Data

From: Cross, S. E., Bacon, P.L., & Morris, M. L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-

construal and relationships. Journal o
f Personality and Social Psychology,

78, 791-808.

INSTRUCTIONS

Beside each statement write the number that best matches your agreement or disagreement.

Please respond to every statement. Thank you.

I =STRONGLY DISAGREE

4=DON'T AGREE OR

S=AGREE SOMEWHAT

2=DISAGREE

DISAGREE

6=AGREE

3=SOMEWHAT DISAGREE

7=STRONGL Y AGREE

Corrected

Item

item/total r

My close relationships are an important reflection of who I am.

0.68

When I feel very close to someone, it often feels to me like that

person is an important part of who I am.

0.69

I usually feel a strong sense of pride when someone close to me has

an important accomplishment

0.54

I think one of the most important parts of who I am can be captured

by looking at my close friends and understanding who they are.

0.64

When I think of myself, I often think of my close friends or family

also.

0.63
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If a person hurts someone close to me, I feel personally hurt as

well.

0.53

In general, my close relationships are an important part of my self

0.69

image.

Overall, my close relationships have very little to do with how I

feel about myself.*

0.54

My close relationships are unimportant to my sense of what kind of

person I am.*

0.52

My sense of pride comes from knowing who I have as close

friends.

0.56

When I establish a close friendship with someone, I usually develop

a strong sense of identification with that person.

0.6

Note. N = 4,288. Response scale ranges from I (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

*

Reverse-keyed item
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